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Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional Recognition 
(Forthcoming in Human Studies. Please refer to published version.) 
James Jardine  
 
 
In recent years, a renewed interest in the relationship between phenomenology and critical social 
theory has begun to emerge. On the one hand, there have been important steps made in challenging 
a dominant assessment of phenomenology as hopelessly solipsistic and formalistic, and thus as 
uninterested in social matters and inherently unable to address them. Not only do social theorists 
and phenomenologists share a concern with the issue of intersubjectivity (broadly construed), but 
the importance of a multi-dimensional understanding of this issue is so fundamental to both 
disciplines that mutual enlightenment between them is not only possible but fruitful and important.1 
On the other hand, recent works in critical social philosophy have actively made use of 
phenomenological analysis, treating it as a crucial tool in clarifying and engaging critically with the 
lived reality and normative structure of concrete social phenomena.2 In this paper, I attempt to 
contribute to these efforts by making use of Edith Stein’s phenomenological analyses of empathy, 
emotion, and personhood to clarify and critically assess the recent suggestion by Axel Honneth that 
a basic form of recognition is affective in nature.3 I will begin by critically considering Honneth’s 
own presentation of this claim (“Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition”), before turning 
to Stein’s account of empathy, arguing that it demarcates an elementary form of recognition in a less 
problematic fashion than does Honnneth’s own treatment of this issue (“Stein’s Analysis of 
Empathy”). I will then spell out the consequences of this move for the emotional recognition 
thesis, arguing that Stein’s treatment lends it further credence (“Empathy and Emotional 
Recognition”), before concluding with some remarks on the connection between recognition and 
emotional personality. 
                                                          
1 For seminal examples of this, see the efforts made by Steinbock (1995) and Zahavi (2001) to demonstrate 
the contemporary importance of Husserl’s analyses of, e.g., transcendental intersubjectivity, generativity, 
normality, typicality, and the lifeworld(s). See also the classical works by, e.g., Schutz (1967), Gurwitsch 
(1979), and Paci (1972). From the side of critical social theory, Honneth (2008: 29–35; 1995b: 150–169; 2007: 
118–121) has engaged, in an occasionally critical but generally open-minded and appreciative way, with the 
work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Levinas. 
2 See, for example, the recent studies by Jaeggi (2014) and Guenther (2013). 
3 I am unfortunately unable to explicitly address here the extent to which the rather different frameworks 
underlying Honneth and Stein’s work (i.e. the former’s strong intersubjectivism and normativism, versus the 
latter’s phenomenological approach) can be easily and productively reconciled; an important and interesting 
issue that would (at least) require a separate paper. Indeed, my approach will be generally closer to the 
phenomenological methodology adopted by Stein. On the other hand, given that Honneth himself gives 
phenomenological considerations a fundamental role, and that I will be addressing issues that he takes to be 
of fundamental importance to his own project, this omission will not, I hope, render my argument wholly 
superfluous. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to make this limitation of the paper more 
explicit. 
 Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition 
 
In an important publication, Invisibility, Axel Honneth seeks to clarify what he calls the ‘moral 
epistemology of recognition’ by means of an analysis of ‘social visibility’ (2003: 10).4 The initial 
question guiding his discussion is the following: “what must be added to the perception of a 
person—to taking cognizance of him—in order to make it into an act of recognition” (2001: 111)? 
Honneth raises this issue because he starts from the assumption that for a person to be either 
socially visible or invisible, her literal visibility must already be established (2001: 114)—although, as 
we will see, his discussion ultimately shows that this apparently obvious premise requires nuancing. 
But what does this alleged distinction between literal and social visibility amount to? Honneth 
stipulates that someone is literally visible to someone else when that person is correctly identified, by 
another person who perceptually encounters him or her, as a currently present individual of 
determinate features. In short, someone’s being literally visible is a matter of her being perceptually 
present to another person, who in their turn apprehends one in a veridical, and predicative-
judgemental, act of cognition or Erkennen (2001: 113). When it comes to social visibility, on the 
other hand, matters are not so simple. Indeed, we must consider characterisations deriving from two 
perspectives: that of the socially visible person, and that of the person for whom she is socially 
visible. To begin with the former, Honneth writes that to be socially visible is a matter of living in a 
social space of “interactive relationships” in which one is aware of having been accorded a “social 
validity” (or “affirmed”) with respect to the “role of a specific social type” (whether acquaintance, 
cleaning lady, or fellow traveller) by one’s interactive partners in that social space (2001: 119).5 This 
can be helpfully contrasted with the experience of one’s own social invisibility, which Honneth 
describes as “non-existence in a social sense” (2001: 111). Despite (indeed, precisely as) being visible 
to others in the literal sense, the socially invisible person experiences the “humiliation” of 
encountering others who fail to offer her any visible acknowledgement that she is a person within a 
social space (2001: 114). Honneth’s prime example of such invisibility is the first-person narrator of 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man: a black person who feels himself rendered ‘invisible’ by the near-
constant and ritualized manner in which the (white) people he encounters in his social world ‘look 
through’ and actively and publicly fail to ‘see’ him as a person. 
A more detailed characterization of social visibility (and its negative counterpart) is offered by 
Honneth in his description of the recognitive activity that renders another person ‘socially visible’. 
Since literal visibility is necessary for both social visibility and social invisibility and sufficient for 
                                                          
4 In regard to Honneth’s broader project of reconstructing a critical social theory based on recognition, see 
the detailed study found in Petherbridge (2013), as well as Honneth’s own presentation in his inaugural 
lecture (2007: 63–79). 
5 Notably, phenomenologists have also emphasized the role of social types and typification in empathy and 
interpersonal understanding. For recent treatments of this issue, see Zahavi (2010: 300–301) and Taipale 
(2015b). 
neither, and since social invisibility is suffered by subjects who are routinely denied visible 
acknowledgement, Honneth stipulates that the activity of rendering somebody socially visible must 
consist, at least in part, in some form of expressive and publicly performed bodily activity directed 
towards that person in her visible presence (2001: 114f.). This bodily expression, which comprises 
the properly public aspect of an act of “recognizing” a perceptually present person, conveys to this 
person that the one who performs it is aware of her, and is aware of her not merely “cognitively” 
but in the manner of an “affirmation” (2001: 115). To illustrate this, Honneth offers the following 
examples: 
Even adult persons usually make clear reciprocally in their communications, through a multitude of 
finely nuanced, expressive responses, that the other is welcome or deserves special attention: a friend 
at a party is worthy of a sparkling smile or a strongly articulated welcoming gesture, the cleaning lady 
in one’s apartment is offered a gesture hinting at gratitude that extends beyond the speech act of 
greeting, and the black person is greeted like all other persons in the train compartment with 
changing facial expressions or a quick nod of the head (2001: 119). 
In Honneth’s discussion of such recognitive gestures, several intriguing claims emerge. On the one 
hand, Honneth notes that while such bodily movements are in one sense voluntary actions in and of 
themselves, in another sense they are better described as a kind of “meta-action,” in as much as they 
make it clear to the other person that their agent is willing to act in a particular type of way in the 
future, hence allowing the other to form an expectation of the kind of treatment she will be in for as 
the encounter unfolds. Thus, “a welcoming gesture among adults expresses the fact that one can 
subsequently reckon upon benevolent actions,” while “the absence of gestures of recognition” 
suggests, in the space of the encounter, that the other “must be prepared for hostile actions” (2001: 
120). 
Importantly however, such meta-practical recognition of the other is not merely a matter of a 
habitual compliance with social codes, as if recognizing another person were simply a matter of 
being willing to act towards another individual in a merely customary fashion; rather, Honneth 
claims that all “direct” forms of recognition—i.e. those by means of which a perceived other is 
rendered socially visible in one way or another—possess a “moral core” (2001: 122). This moral 
dimension of direct recognition appears to stem from the fact that the meta-practical commitments 
it institutes are rooted in an acknowledgment that the other is a person, an acknowledgement that is 
partially constituted by a certain kind of evaluation, in which the other’s personhood is taken to be 
something of moral significance. In performatively recognizing the other, the recognizing subject 
makes it clear that she takes the other to be a person and that she is willing to treat the other in a 
way that persons, and only persons, ought to be treated. As Honneth puts it, the diverse forms of 
direct recognition each involve an appraisal of the personality of the other as having a certain 
“worth,” and this appraisal is implicit in the reciprocally understood meaning of the public gesture, 
since such gestures reveal to the recognized person that their agent is “motivated to treat him in the 
future according to his worth” (ibid.). Furthermore, Honneth notes that the spectrum of different 
forms of direct recognition is far from homogenous, and that it includes “fine distinctions” insofar 
as different recognitive gestures betray different types of evaluative appraisal, as well as being 
directed towards and appraising different aspects of the other’s personal life in its social dimensions. 
Although acknowledging that these three “possibilities” are far from exhaustive, Honneth offers as 
examples of direct recognition those gestures which betray love, respect, and solidarity (122f.). 
Thus, Honneth’s claim here is that recognition involves a certain kind of personal appraisal of the 
other, one which is simultaneously publically intelligible as something that will serve as guiding for 
the recognizing subject’s practical activity. But what more exactly is the nature of this appraisal? 
While his account to some extent vacillates on this point, Honneth seems to suggest that the 
evaluative character of direct recognition arises in part from its being expressive of a specific type 
of emotional stance, one which is held by the recognizing subject and directed towards the other 
person.6 Thus, what the recognitive gesture most directly expresses is an affectively grounded 
evaluation of the other (of one or another form), and this emotional stance is furthermore 
immediately intelligible to the person recognized as having motivational consequences, namely as 
eliciting in the recognizing subject a desire to treat the recognized person in a morally appropriate 
fashion (in one or another sense). As Honneth writes: “Whether someone smiles lovingly or merely 
greets one respectfully, whether someone extends his hand emphatically or merely nods his head in a 
benevolent way, in each case a different type of emotional readiness to engage morally with the 
addressee is signalled with the expressive gesture” (2001: 122, my emphasis). This is not to say, of 
course, that all forms of recognition merely involve a person being affectively moved, or even 
involve affect at all. Certainly, the examples offered by Honneth in Invisibility seem to involve the act 
of recognition being rooted in a certain type of affective stance, in that they each involve a certain 
type of emotionally expressive gesture or movement (2001: 119). On the other hand, the recognition 
of a person’s legal rights, for example, might not require any specific emotional response, personal 
evaluation, or even bodily gesture, since here an implicit or explicit commitment to act in accordance 
with certain practical norms is often sufficient.7 
Ultimately, Honneth notes that an important consequence of his analysis is that the notion of 
cognition with which he began is in need of revision. When the manner in which we immediately 
respond to those who we take as socially visible is considered, it becomes clear that (in such cases at 
least) our most basic comportment towards others is fused with recognitive elements. Honneth thus 
suggests that, for non-pathological mature adults, the perception of others is rarely the value-neutral 
cognition of an identifiable object, but is rather an “evaluative perception in which the worth of 
other persons is directly given” (2001: 125). Indeed, when it comes to our social experience, value-
neutral and purely judicative identification is a rather rare case, one that occurs only when “an 
original recognizing is neutralized” (2001: 126). In short, recognition is grounded in a form of 
evaluative intentionality already present in our perceptual awareness of others. Honneth thus 
wonders whether his initial construal of literal visibility might be in need of revision, given that it 
                                                          
6 See the interesting, although apparently slightly different, account offered by Honneth his discussion of the 
Kantian notion of respect (2001: 222). 
7 Honneth discusses the different forms of recognition pertaining to love, rights, and solidarity, in his seminal 
work, The Struggle for Recognition (1995a, 92–139). 
now seems questionable to postulate a form of cognition uncontaminated by recognitive elements as 
a basic and self-sufficient layer in our relations to others. 
In a later text, Reification, Honneth revisits and deepens his suggestion that affect plays a central role 
in recognition. Here he is at pains to describe a distinctive and basic form of recognition, one that, 
he claims, is already presupposed by forms of recognition in which other persons’ cognitive and 
moral attitudes and social statuses are taken as “a corrective authority” to one’s own (2008: 42). 
Drawing on developmental psychology as well as conceptual analysis, Honneth argues that the 
ability to take over another person’s perspective through communication is “attached to the hardly 
accessible prerequisite of emotional receptivity or identification” (2008: 46). He moreover describes 
such a recognitive stance as a form of ‘sympathy’ (Anteilnahme),8 by which he means an emotional 
mode of comportment in which the rhythm of the other’s emotional life affects the sympathetic 
subject, presenting itself as having a certain value and thus as an “invitation to act” (2008: 45, 49f., 
57f.). Thus, and following a distinction already present in his discussion of invisibility, Honneth 
seeks here to distinguish this “emotional recognition,” in which the other is recognized in a 
sympathetic or benevolent manner (2008: 46), from “that particular form of mutual recognition” in 
which the “other person’s specific characteristics are affirmed” (2008: 51). 
Honneth also seeks to delineate a certain type of general stance towards other persons, one which is 
presupposed and articulated by specific acts of recognition and recognitive relationships, and which 
he thus describes as an “elementary” or even “existential” mode of recognition (2008: 51, 90). 
Crucially, this general stance is also taken to be a presupposition for any active denial of substantial 
recognitive acts. Like the different modes of positive recognition, the forms of social activity rooted 
in the denial of recognition constitute a broad spectrum, from the basic act of responding to others 
in an emotionally negative way (2008: 51), to the more extreme cases of ‘reification,’ in which the 
other person is treated in a purely instrumental fashion and denied any moral significance 
whatsoever (2008: 58f.). And yet all of these stances, like all specific acts of positive recognition, are 
rooted in this elementary recognitive stance, which Honneth characterizes as a “practical, non-
epistemic attitude that must be taken up if one is to attain knowledge of the world or other persons” 
(2008: 54). 
In a further step, one which is on the face of things tempting to follow, Honneth connects the two 
claims, maintaining that this elementary mode of recognition itself “contains an element of affective 
sympathy” (2005: 59 [2008: 50]), or more strongly, that it just is a stance of sympathetic-affective 
recognition.9 One consequence of this move is that Honneth must then offer an account of how 
sympathy and affective valuation can indeed comprise a fundamental and universal layer in our 
other-relations, since this is exactly the role which elementary recognition is supposed to play. After 
                                                          
8 In the English version of this text, the (not readily translatable) German term “Anteilnahme” is mostly 
rendered as “empathic engagement,” but in light of my later discussion of a slightly different notion of 
empathy, I use here the translation “sympathy”. 
9 Thus, to cite one example of many, Honneth writes of “einer vorgängigen Einstellung der 
Anerkennungoder Anteilnahme” as being prior to all cognitive attitudes with regard to the world of social 
relations (2005: 63, my emphasis). 
all, it is far from obvious that all of our relations to others, and in particular those involving mere 
indifference or the active denial of positive recognition, are rooted in sympathy. Honneth is certainly 
aware of this problem, and he claims that an appropriate account can be given for both of the 
characteristic cases of recognitive denial already mentioned—namely, negative emotional responses, 
and reification. In enacting a negative emotional response to another person, Honneth writes, “we 
still always have a residual sense of not having done full justice to their personalities. In such a 
situation, the element in our recognitional stance which we customarily call ‘conscience’ would be at 
issue” (2008: 51).10 
Now, I take it that Honneth here identifies a relatively prevalent and philosophically interesting facet 
of our social and, more broadly, emotional being—namely, the sense in which our emotional 
responses can be appropriate or inappropriate to the matters which they target, and can moreover 
be immediately lived as such, through their accompaniment by an element of second-order and self-
directed affect (such as pride, embarrassment, shame, or guilt).11 However, as a defence of the claim 
that our other-relations necessarily and universally contain an element of sympathetic recognition, 
Honneth’s allusion to this phenomenon seems unpersuasive. Perhaps we can concede that, in those 
instances where we are aware of unsympathetic responses as being normatively inappropriate, a 
primitive form of sympathetic recognition thereby shows itself to be operative in our experience. 
But whatever the merits of this line of thought, it appears to have no bearing upon the diversity of 
situations in which an individual responds to another person in an unsympathetic fashion, and does 
so without any sense of her response being inappropriate. Indeed we frequently feel, whether 
correctly or incorrectly, our negative response to another person to be fully justified. Honneth’s 
claim that sympathetic recognition plays a ubiquitous and fundamental role in our relations to others 
thus appears questionable, or at least in need of further argumentation. After all, one would surely 
have to be an unusually compassionate and self-critical individual to experience all of one’s non-
sympathetic feelings for and engagement with others as being inappropriate in nature. And as this 
observation suggests, not only is it the case that many of our responses to others contain no 
identifiable trace of sympathy, but the extent to which we do respond to others sympathetically is 
just as much rooted in our specific emotional personalities, and in the specific nature of the 
perceived actions and suspected personalities of those that we respond to, as it is in our bare 
recognition of those others as persons. 
It follows from this that if we are to hold onto the notion of an elementary recognition underlying 
even our non-benevolent and merely indifferent responses to others, the terrain in which such 
recognition is to be located must lie below the level of any specific form of emotional or practical 
comportment. That is, any attempt to identify elementary recognition with emotional recognition is 
                                                          
10 For reasons of space I am unable to discuss here Honneth’s attempt to render cases of reification 
compatible with his claims regarding elementary recognition (2008: 52–63). 
11 For a discussion of the manner in which emotions of self-approbation or -disapprobation (such as pride, 
embarrassment, shame, or guilt) can be directed towards a first-order emotional response, bringing about a 
lived and pre-reflective sense of that response being normatively appropriate or inappropriate, see 
Drummond (2004: 123f.). 
ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, and as Honneth has persuasively illustrated, elementary 
recognition must be such that it can be made intelligible how emotional recognition can 
function immediately in our relations to others. We should retain our grip on the insight that our basic 
recognition of others as persons is typically infused with and accompanied by forms of other-
directed affect, and while these primitive affective responses to others may not be as unconditionally 
affirmative as Honneth seems to suggest, his insistence that an element of sympathetic emotional 
recognition can be operative already at a very basic level of our other-relations—at least in certain 
cases and under certain conditions—is both intuitively persuasive and in need of further 
clarification. In the remainder of this paper, and taking my basis in the phenomenological analyses of 
empathy and emotion found in the early work of Edith Stein, I will delineate one way in which these 
two desiderata can be fulfilled. My basic claim will be that if elementary recognition is identified with 
what Stein calls empathy (Einfühlung), then it becomes intelligible how it can provide an immanent 
basis for emotional recognition, while simultaneously allowing that the details of specific cases of 
emotional recognition (or its denial) have a certain dependency upon the interpersonal context in 
which they are enacted (or denied).12 
To summarize briefly, Honneth’s suggestive analyses of the relations between social visibility, 
recognition, and emotion raise the following points. On the one hand, our lived visibility to one 
another in a social (as opposed to ‘literal’) sense, is not exhausted by our perceived spatial proximity, 
but is also shaped by the bodily gestures we direct towards one another, inasmuch as these gestures 
serve to express recognitive stances. In many cases, such recognitive stances point towards the 
affirmation or of the other persons’ social status and indicate nothing more than an intention to 
treat the person accordingly. Other recognitive gestures, however, are more accurately understood as 
primarily expressive of an emotional stance held by the recognizing person and directed towards the 
person recognized. Such expressive stances of emotional recognition also confirm certain moral 
expectations on behalf of the recognized subject, inasmuch as they convey a certain kind of affective 
valuation of the other as a person, and a willingness to do justice to the other’s personal value in the 
ongoing course of the encounter. On the other hand, they are not ordinarily the product of a 
process of deliberation, nor are they motivated by instrumental or egoistic purposes. Rather, such 
emotional recognition is a matter of an immediate and affective responsiveness to the personhood 
of the other, a responsiveness which appears just as basic as the literal ‘seeing’ of the recognized 
person. Finally I have suggested that, in order to account for the variety of possibilities for 
emotional recognition, as well as its possible denial, we need to turn to a level of 
recognition below any emotional stance proper—and this we can find in Stein’s analysis of empathy. 
 
Stein’s Analysis of Empathy 
                                                          
12 The convergence between elementary recognition and empathy has been briefly noted, but not discussed in 
any detail, by Zahavi (2010: 305). See also the phenomenologically minded discussions of elementary 
recognition from Varga (2010), and Varga and Gallagher (2012), although the role of empathy is not 
considered. 
 Stein’s discussion of empathy is driven by the conviction that there is a distinctive and irreducible 
type of intentional experience in which other experiencing subjects are given and apprehended as 
such, and she names this experience empathy, defining it as “the experience of foreign 
consciousness in general,” or as “the experience of foreign subjects and their lived experience” 
(2008: 20, 5 [11, 1, translation modified]).13 For Stein, those philosophical or psychological theories 
which take our everyday familiarity with other minded persons and their experiential lives to be 
primarily rooted in theoretical postulation or imaginative projection are flawed from the outset, since 
they fail to do justice to the experiential context in which such familiarity arises. More specifically, 
such theories overlook the distinctive character of empathy, since they tend to presume that we do 
not directly experience other minded persons, but only their bodies as inanimate entities (2008: 41 
[26]). On the basis of this assumption, one is naturally led to believe that the inner life of the other is 
something which can only be posited and accessed through a subsequent (theoretical or imaginative) 
step. On Stein’s view, however, such a postulated gap between the directly given and foreign 
mindedness is completely at odds with our lived acquaintance of others, and is accordingly to be 
dismissed as deceptive. Rather, as she notes, when we consider the “complete, concrete 
phenomenon” of another person as she appears before us in a face-to-face encounter, we discover a 
peculiar and complex whole that “is not given as a physical body, but as a sensing lived body in 
which an ego inheres, an ego that senses, thinks, feels and wills. This lived body not only fits into my 
phenomenal world, but is itself the centre of orientation of such a phenomenal world” (2008: 13 [5, 
translation modified]). Empathy, for Stein, is exactly the mode of experiencing involved with this 
complex presence of the other as an embodied and world-directed subject, and the task of her 
analyses are to clarify its distinctive character. 
Stein begins this clarification by considering how empathy compares with other varieties of 
intentional experience. Since the basic presence of the other as an embodied and experiencing 
subject is direct in nature, since the other’s body in its posture and style of movement is immediately 
given to us as perceptually engaged and coloured by foreign affective shades, Stein occasionally 
describes certain forms of empathy as being perceptual in nature (e.g., 2008: 15, 31, 75), although 
she always emphasizes that empathic perception differs in crucial respects from the perceptual 
experience of material objects, or ‘thing-perception,’ as I will call it. This thought becomes more 
clearly intelligible if we recall that thing-perception, when considered in a phenomenological light, 
reveals an interplay of originary and non-originary modes of givenness. While, during a phase of 
perceptual experience, certain aspects of a material thing perceptually appear in vivid sensuous 
presence (e.g., the curved brickwork of a bridge as one swims the backstroke beneath it), in order 
for our perceptual experience to be lived as of its object (in order that, e.g., the curved brickwork 
                                                          
13 When referring to Stein, I have used the critical Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe editions of Zum Problem der 
Einfühlung and Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründing der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften (2008, 2010). Where 
possible, I have indicated in square brackets the relevant pagination in the English edition (1989, 2000), 
although I have occasionally differed terminologically from these translators in my rendering of Stein’s 
German. 
appear as the underside of a bridge), our perceptual experience must take its object as a whole which 
is irreducible to its sensuously present aspects, and which includes aspects which are not currently 
sensuously given, but rather merely ‘co-given’ or ‘appresented,’ in a ‘co-originary’ fashion. As Stein 
points out, something analogous occurs in our experience of others as embodied subjects (2008: 14f. 
[6f.]). During a phase of our perception of another person, certain aspects of the other’s body 
appear with an unparalleled sensuous presence (e.g., the increasingly reddening and scowling cheeks 
of a friend as I confess to her a foolish act), yet frequently a certain kind of foreign psychic content 
is simultaneously given ‘in’ the sensuously present features (e.g., the anger directly manifest in her 
facial expressions). In such cases, we live through a unified perceptual enactment, one that is not 
only directed towards the other’s body as itself reaching beyond the sensuously given, but which also 
includes a perceptual co-givenness of certain facets of the other’s own psychic life, such that what is 
given is not merely a material object but an expressive whole. As Stein writes: “one must indeed 
designate as outer perception the complex act which co-grasps the expressed psyche with its bodily 
expression” (2008: 15). Thus, for a certain type of empathy, we can even say that foreign subjectivity 
“is given in the flesh (leibhafter Gegebenheit),” albeit “in the special sense of co-givenness” (2008: 31). 
However, Stein emphasizes that this perceptual variety of empathy exhibits a striking contrast with 
thing-perception, insofar as the co-givenness of psychic states ‘in’ their bodily presence differs 
structurally (and not merely in ‘content’) from the co-givenness of concealed aspects of a perceived 
thing. It is, after all, possible for the latter to become sensuously present, and as Stein notes 
(following Husserl), this is not merely a contingent fact about the object but an a priori structural 
feature of perceptual experience (2008: 14 [6f.]). In contrast to this, and again for essential reasons, a 
perception of another person’s bodily movements as directly embodying her pain cannot be 
transformed into an originary awareness of this pain (ibid.). Stein’s formulation here points towards 
a further crucial feature of her account, namely the way she contrasts empathy and self-awareness. 
Again, this contrast is not simply a matter of a divergence in content, but crucially involves a 
different mode of givenness. While one’s own experiential life is immediately and originarily lived 
through in the mode of self-awareness, and is so even prior to the thematising gaze of reflection, the 
experiential lives of other persons always present themselves as ‘foreign’ exactly because they 
are not given in such a fashion. Thus an invariant structural feature of all empathic experience is that 
the experiential life which it directly targets is not lived through originarily as one’s own experiences 
are; indeed, empathized experiences are rather given as lived through originally by the other, and by 
her alone (2008: 54, 28 [38, 17]). Exactly because experiences given through empathy lack this 
“selfness” inherent in one’s own lived experiencing (ibid.), and indeed do so for structural reasons, 
Stein maintains that empathy always involves intrinsically non-originary elements, even when it 
participates in the complex originality of perceptual experience (2008: 20). 
Empathy, therefore, has a peculiar status. On the one hand, it is a characteristically non-originary 
form of experiencing which essentially contrasts both with self-experience and thing-perception. On 
the other hand, however, empathy functions as an epistemic parallel to these ‘originary’ forms of 
experience. It is a basic and direct evidential source of everyday social knowledge, providing prima 
facie justification for those judgements and beliefs of ours that concern the affective, volitional, and 
perceptual stances of other persons (2008: 31, 38 [19, 24]). Moreover, as a form of evidential access 
to what is, and is here and now, empathy differs strikingly from other non-originary forms of 
experience, such as memory, expectation, and imagination. Hence, Stein advances the bold, yet 
seemingly unavoidable, hypothesis that “we have in empathy”—as an irreducible and wholly 
distinctive type of intentional experience, involving the direct givenness of foreign 
subjectivity as foreign—“an experiencing act sui generis” (2008: 20 [11]). 
A further distinctive feature of empathy comes into view when we explicate Stein’s insight that the 
empathized other doesn’t merely face us as an object in our visual field; rather, other people are also 
given as embodied centres of orientation for their own visual fields, and as intentional subjects 
whose experiences are directed towards worldly objects. As Stein’s analyses reveal, this is the case 
already at the previously discussed level of empathic perception. We do not only “see” other 
people’s bodily members as bearers of sensations of various types—such as, in Stein’s examples, the 
perceived foreign hand which “‘presses’ against the table more or less strongly,” and “lies there 
limpid and stretched,” or the person who is seen to be feeling cold “by his ‘goose flesh’ or his blue 
nose” (2008: 75, 78 [58, 61]). We also directly perceive others as engaging the style of kinaesthetic 
self-movement and attentive immersion characteristic of perceptual experience (2008: 85 [67f.]). As 
such, we simultaneously grasp the other’s lived body as a centre of orientation for her perceptual 
acts. As Stein emphasizes, this is not to be confused with an act of imagination (Phantasie), in which I 
attempt to bring to mind how things would look were I to adopt the other’s posture and position, 
and nor does it require a detailed understanding of the details of the other’s perceptual field (2008: 
79 [61f.]). Rather, this empathic grasp is more accurately described as a perceiving of the other’s 
bodily movements as intimating a “perceiving consciousness in general,” that is, a certain generic 
structure (2008: 80 [62]). Although Stein doesn’t explicitly make this point, we might add that it is 
also often perceptually evident which specific objects another person is attending to, or at least in 
which general direction her visual gaze is turned. 
Moreover, the experiential possibilities of empathy are not exhausted by our immediate perceptual 
contact with the other. The lived perception of the other as an embodied subject always implies 
tendencies towards further empathic enactments, in which the other’s empathetic sense can be 
explicated, further determined, and potentially superseded. Some of these motivated enactments 
remain within the realm of empathic perception. As Stein notes, when “I empathize the pain of the 
injured in looking at a wound, I tend to look to his face to have my experience confirmed in the 
expression of suffering” (2008: 103 [84]). As with our perceptual experience of material objects, 
empathic perception contains its own immanent standards of correctness, in such a way that our 
initial grasp of the other’s subjective life can be confirmed or disconfirmed through the ongoing 
course of empathic perception—an observation which also suggests that complex structures of 
typification and anticipation are already operative in that initial grasp. In other cases, however, the 
empathic enactments motivated by our initial perceptual contact with the other, and that serve to 
explicate its sense, are of an entirely different level of accomplishment (Vollzugsstufe). When the 
other’s sadness faces us as directly given in her facial expressions, we frequently “feel ourselves led 
by it” (2008: 31 [19]), in that the theme of our empathic interest becomes not merely that the other is 
sad, but what she is sad about and why this state of affairs elicits sadness in her. In such cases, the 
other’s experiential life “is no longer an object in the proper sense. Rather, it has pulled me into it, 
and I am now no longer turned to the experience but to its object, I am in the position of its 
subject” (2008: 19 [10]). Here we are dealing not merely with a perception of the other as an 
embodied and experiencing subject, but a presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) of her experiences with 
their objective correlates. Indeed, this stage of empathy is more closely analogous to imagination or 
memory than perception, in that the empathizing subject becomes momentarily aware of an 
experiential context in its lived concreteness, but one that differs in certain essential ways from her 
own current perceptual sphere. However, Stein emphasizes that here too empathy remains distinct 
from imagination and memory, targeting a different domain of experiences (namely, those of the 
other, not a past or imagined self), and having a different type of epistemic import and motivation 
(2008: 19f., [10f.]).14  
As the final step in our survey of Stein’s treatment of empathy, we should return to her claim that 
the other is given as a complex unity, as in individual who is simultaneously perceptually, affectively, 
and volitionally engaged with the world, and is so exactly in the manner of foreign embodied 
subjectivity. As should now be clear, when more closely considered this unified givenness of the 
other reveals itself as an integrated complex comprising various distinct moments of empathic 
awareness. These distinct moments of empathy are each directed to different aspects of the others’ 
experiential life, and they function together through ongoing experience in a motivated fashion. A 
further striking feature comes into play, however, when we note that the other’s various mental 
states themselves (as the correlates of these empathic moments) are empathically given, not as 
unrelated to one another, but as themselves manifesting intelligible motivational relations. And as 
Stein underlines, it is in light of this that empathy presents us, not merely with psychophysical 
unities, but with persons. In experiencing the other’s emotional responses as motivated by objects and 
states of affairs that she grasps through perception or judgement, and likewise in experiencing her 
actions as being motivated in part by these emotional responses, the other directly manifests her 
personhood (2008: 127 [109]). 
While I cannot explicate this line of thought fully here, two key components should be emphasized. 
On the one hand, the motivational relationships that connect, e.g., perception, emotion, and action, 
involve and manifest a form of rationality that is unique to persons (2008: 114f., 129f. [96f., 112]). 
While what is at stake here in the theoretical and practical domains should be more clear, the sense 
in which emotion exhibits rationality is perhaps less evident. Stein claims that our emotional 
enactments have a distinctive intentional structure, since emotional experience involves, at least in 
part, a quasi-perceptual experience of value that Stein (following Scheler and Husserl) terms ‘value-
perception,’ (Wertnehmen) in which a person directly ‘feels’ an object, person, or situation as having a 
certain evaluative significance. “In joy the subject has something joyous facing him, in fright 
something frightening, in fear something threatening” (2008: 108f. [92]). Furthermore, the evaluative 
                                                          
14 Stein’s descriptions of this level or modality of empathy are highly suggestive but could probably benefit 
with more precision. Unsurprisingly, one finds a variety of interpretations in the secondary literature. See 
Zahavi (2014: 137f.), Jardine (2015), Shum (2012: 185–195) and Dullstein (2013: 343–346). 
aspect of emotional experience is always motivated by a subject’s perceptions or judgements, since a 
meaningful evaluative grasp of an object requires that object be first given as having certain features, 
namely those in light of which the emotional response is enacted (2008: 116–120 [98–102]; 2010: 
133f. [159–160]). Due to their evaluative and motivational character, our emotional responses thus 
exhibit a certain intelligibility and responsiveness to norms, such that they can be assessed in terms 
of their appropriateness to the situation that elicits them (2008: 119f. [101]).15 On the other hand, 
the way in which a person responds in a motivated fashion to a given situation or state of affairs 
frequently exhibits her unique personality. Stein’s discussion is again distinctive in her emphasis on 
emotional personality, which she regards as a creative sphere of affective valuing with a determinate 
and enduring character. In enacting an emotional response, persons simultaneously manifest an 
emotional disposition or habituality, or as one can also simply say, an ‘emotion’ that persists beyond 
its specific episodic appearance.16 As Stein puts it, “I not only grasp an actual feeling in the friendly 
glance, but friendliness as a habitual feature (Eigenschaft),” just as “an outburst of anger reveals to me 
a ‘violent temperament'” (2008: 104 [86, translation modified]). 
In order to underline the distinctive character of Stein’s treatment of empathy, we can fruitfully 
compare it to the sophisticated simulationist account recently offered by Karsten Stueber, which 
hinges upon a distinction between two different types of empathy.17 On the one hand, basic 
empathy involves a quasi-perceptual ability to recognize other persons as minded beings, as well as to 
identify certain of their more embodied mental states, allowing us to apprehend, in Stueber’s words, 
“that another person is angry, or that he intends to grasp a cup”. Reenactive empathy, on the other hand, 
involves imaginatively imitating the other’s experiences so as to achieve a more complex 
understanding of the other person’s mental states, a process which targets the reasons and motives 
which underlie her thoughts, emotions, and actions, and which allow them to be assessed in terms of 
their appropriateness with respect to rational norms. Crucially, Stueber claims that reenactive 
empathy plays a central and unique role in interpersonal understanding, since it is only through 
reproducing an experiential episode as if were our own that we can understand the subject of the 
episode as a rational agent (2006: 20f.). In support of this claim, he appeals to two distinctive features 
which he regards as necessary conditions for our mental states exhibiting rationality and norm-
responsiveness, arguing that understanding mental states in terms of these features necessarily 
requires situating them within a first-personal perspective. Once this is established, it follows that 
understanding others’ mental states as enactments of rational agents requires reenactive empathy, 
since it necessarily requires us to put ourselves “in the other person’s shoes” and seek to understand 
                                                          
15 For a detailed phenomenological discussion of the motivational and evaluative nature of the emotions, see 
Drummond (2013). See also the papers in the present Special Issue by Szanto (2015) and Vendrell Ferran 
(2015), which deal with Stein’s account of emotional rationality as well as the contribution by Taipale (2015a), 
who develops Stein's view that in empathy we typically take another person's emotions to be situated in a 
motivational context unique to that person. 
16 See Goldie (2000: 12–16), Drummond (2004). 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to relate Stein’s position to this distinction 
from the contemporary debate. 
her mental states as if they were our own, thus providing them with the first-personal framework 
necessary for their rationality to be comprehended and assessed (2006: 152, 160, 164f.).18 
The first feature of rational agency which Stueber appeals to is its contextuality. The thought here, 
briefly, is that in understanding what a person could appropriately specify as a reason for her beliefs, 
emotions, or actions, reference to a universal framework of norms will typically be insufficient. 
Rather, what counts appropriately as a reason is largely a context-dependent issue, and this context is 
only something which we understand through being first-personally immersed in it, or by imagining 
ourselves to be so immersed (2006: 152–161). The second feature of rational agency concerns the 
essential indexicality of thoughts as reasons. Stueber’s argument here is that in order to understand a 
thought as a reason for action, that thought must be conceptualized as integrated into a unitary 
subjective perspective, since it is only then that it can be construed as a thought ‘owned’ by an agent 
and which could thus serve as guiding for (the same agent’s) behaviour. Stueber thus concludes that 
another person’s thought can only be understood as a thought of a rational agent—as opposed to 
simply an ‘internal event’ that one might identify in a quasi-perceptual manner—in as much as the 
empathizing subject understands it as a thought that could be her own, and which could, if it were 
her own, serve as a reason for her own action. And clearly, this way of understanding an agent’s 
thoughts involves some form of reenactment (2006: 161–165). In short, to construe a person’s 
thoughts, emotions, and actions as context-appropriate and as motivationally related to other 
thoughts, emotions, and actions had by the same person—and thus as participating in rational 
agency—it is necessary to imaginatively reconstruct the other person’s own first personal perspective 
(reenactive empathy), and not merely to perceptually identify the other person’s discrete mental 
states (basic empathy). 
While I am unable to offer here a detailed comparison of the proposals offered by Stueber and Stein, 
it is worth noting that Stueber’s distinction between basic and reenactive empathy roughly coincides 
with at least one of the distinctions drawn by Stein in her own account.19 We have already seen that 
Stein distinguishes between empathic perception and empathic presentification. While the former 
                                                          
18 Stueber often presents his arguments for re-enactive empathy as criticisms of the theory of mind approach 
adopted by, e.g., Wellman (1990) and Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997), as well as of some hybrid theorists such as 
Nichols and Stitch (2003), as these thinkers deny re-enactive simulation an epistemically central role in social 
cognition (2006: 165–171). Since Stein also explicitly rejects the claim that theoretical influence forms the 
basis of social understanding (see Stein 2008: 40–42 [26–27]), I will not consider the success of these 
arguments as criticisms of theory–theory, but will rather focus on their relation to Stein’s own positive 
proposal. For an extensive phenomenological discussion of the social cognition debate, and a defence of a 
Stein-inspired position within this debate, see Zahavi (2014). 
19 Interestingly, another important distinction drawn by Stein coincides in many respects with Stueber’s, 
namely that between sensuous empathy, in which the other’s body is given as a lived body (i.e., as directly 
embodying fields of sensations), and the variety of empathy which targets the other’s motivated egoic acts. 
On Stein’s account, both sensuous and act-targeting empathy can occur already at the perceptual level, and 
equally they can both undergo explication through presentification (2008: 74–78 [57–62]). A more detailed 
discussion of the merits of Stein’s proposal as compared to Stueber’s would do well to assess whether her pair 
of distinctions allows us to accurately conceptualize a wider variety of empathic situations than does Stueber’s 
more binary account. 
involves my ability to directly grasp the mindedness of the other in her expressive bodily 
movements, the latter involves a form of self-displacement (Hineinversetzen) or re-accomplishment 
(Mitvollzug, Nachvollzug), in which the other’s intentional experiences are understood in their 
motivational interconnectedness, through my bringing them to givenness in a manner that resembles 
the way my own experiences are lived through by me (e.g., Stein 2008: 18–20, 32f., 39, 51 [10f., 20, 
25, 34]). Moreover, Stein would be sympathetic to Stueber’s claim that the quasi-first-personal 
character of reenactment can often serve to deepen our understanding of the rationality of other 
people’s actions and emotions. As she at one point notes, understanding (Verstehen) a person’s 
actions and emotions in a fulfilling manner requires “experiencing (erleben) the transition from one 
part to another within an experiential whole (not: to have [such parts] objectively),” and this is 
presumably something which can only be achieved through re-accomplishing the other’s experiences 
for oneself (Stein 2008: 102f. [83f.]). 
However, the epistemic role that Stein assigns to empathic presentification differs subtly but 
importantly from that which Stueber take re-enactive empathy to play. While Stueber claims that we 
first become acquainted with others as normatively embedded, world-directed, and unitary subjects 
through reenactment, for Stein these features are already implicit within the empathetic sense others 
have for us on the perceptual level, and they rather become more richly and precisely understood 
through our re-accomplishing and explicating the other’s experiences. On her view, empathetic 
presentification doesn’t first introduce a domain of categories that are wholly lacking on the 
perceptual level; rather, it merely “allow[s] us to realize what was first vaguely meant” in our 
perceptually based grasp of the other person’s experiential acts in her expressive bodily movements 
(2008: 31 [20]). One benefit of Stein’s account is that it allows us to capture an experience which, it 
seems to me, is relatively prevalent in our daily lives, namely, those cases in which we perceive 
another person as being in some way purposively immersed in a norm-responsive practical or 
emotional attitude, but feel ourselves unable (or simply lack the interest required) to reenact the 
detailed motivational situation in which the other’s action or emotion is embedded (see 2008: 133 
[115]). Similarly, Stein’s account might be better equipped to deal with those cases in which one is 
directly aware of someone else as responding in emotion or action to a situation whose normatively 
relevant features are evident to both self and other, an awareness which seems to frequently occur 
without any explicit act of reenactment taking place, one’s empathetic understanding rather resting 
upon a shared context of normative relevance to which both subjects are attuned. 
 
Empathy and Emotional Recognition 
 
We are now in a position to consider the relation between empathy and recognition. As discussed in 
the first section, Honneth designates by elementary recognition (i) a certain universal stance held by 
persons towards other persons, one which lies below the level of both objectifying judgement and 
any evaluative appraisal of the other’s specific properties, (ii) a stance in which the personhood of the 
other is nevertheless in some way acknowledged, and (iii) a stance which nevertheless functions 
immediately in our evaluative and practical responses to others and which is hence articulated by 
more positive and specific acts of recognition. As should be clear from the previous section, Stein’s 
description of empathy shows it to exactly fit the first two criteria of elementary recognition. In 
regard to (i), Stein argues that empathy is not to be equated simply with imaginative projection or 
detached theorizing, but is rather analogous to the perception of things, in that it is based in a form 
of intuitive experience in which other persons are directly given as embodied, world-directed, and 
foreign subjects, and thus as having a sense which can be further explicated through our re-
accomplishing their experiential lives for ourselves. And while such experience involves a basic form 
of interpersonal understanding, it is not by necessity a judicative achievement; indeed it rather serves 
the function of motivating, fulfilling, or falsifying our everyday social judgements. In regard to (ii) we 
have seen that, when considered in a phenomenological light, empathy also reveals itself to have a 
complex and integrated structure, one which is correlated with the diversity of senses which the 
other person exhibits. The other is rarely (and perhaps only in pathological cases) given as a mere 
physical entity, rather her bodily movements and expressive gestures immediately manifest an 
embodied, engaged and directed subjective life. In particular, the other’s expressive emotional 
movements are directly grasped as intimating the distinctive responsiveness to and motivation by 
values characteristic of persons. As Stein formulates the point, “I consider every subject in which I 
empathically grasp a perception of value (Wertnehmen) as a person whose lived experiences interlock 
into an intelligible totality of sense” (Stein 2008: 133 [115]). A question immediately arises here, 
however, as regards (iii). For on the Steinian conception of empathy that I have here developed, 
while empathy permits a form of access to the other’s own emotional valuations and in so doing 
discloses the other in her personhood, it is in and of itself a non-emotional and evaluatively neutralform 
of experience. In what sense, then, can we say that empathy, as a purely ‘epistemic’ givenness of the 
other as an embodied person, provides an immanent ground for and is immediately articulated by 
more full-blooded modes of recognition? 
In the following, I will sketch an answer to this question by considering how Stein’s account of the 
relations between empathy, emotion, and personhood might be used to clarify Honneth’s 
conception of emotional recognition. As I earlier argued, what distinguishes elementary and emotional 
recognition is that instances of the latter involve the recognizing subject responding emotionally to 
the person recognized, while the former is rather the underlying experience of the other as a person 
that is articulated by and makes possible such emotional responses. In fact, one can find in Stein’s 
early work a description of how, in various ways, our emotional responses to other persons articulate 
and are grounded in empathy. As Stein points out, there is a distinctive class of emotions which are 
characterized by their uniquely targeting other persons. “Sentiments (Gesinnungen) of love and hate, 
thankfulness, vengeance, animosity, etc., which have the other person as their object, also belong to 
the feeling acts in which layers of the person are exposed” (2008: 120 [101 translation modified]). 
However, she goes on to note that, if such emotions are indeed responses to the other person, then 
they must be based in “the grasping (Erfassen) of the foreign person,” which is to say in a certain 
type of empathy in which the other person is given as such (ibid., [translation modified]). Thus if an 
act of emotional recognition targets another person as another person, or in her personhood, then it 
ought to be motivated by an empathic grasp of the other in her very emotional responsiveness. 
Now, one initial worry might be that this line of thought is excessively cognitivistic; indeed, it might 
appear that we have lost sight altogether of Honneth’s insight that emotional recognition has a 
certain priority over an evaluatively neutral and purely cognitive stance towards the other. To my 
mind, however, this worry is ultimately misguided. As has already been emphasized, empathy 
needn’t involve a cognitive identification in any strong sense, being in its basic form more analogous 
to perceptual experience than to any type of judicative attitude. Furthermore, the claim that 
empathic givenness grounds emotional recognition needn’t be understood as the (absurd) idea that we 
somehow infer our emotional responses from empathic data, nor even as entailing that empathy and 
emotional recognition are always two wholly separate acts. Rather, as Stein explicitly affirms, our 
concrete experience of the world always contains a constitutive moment of affective evaluation, such 
that objects are always given with some degree of axiological sense: “A value-constitution goes hand 
in hand with every object-constitution, every fully constituted object is simultaneously a value-
object, and the value-free fact-world is ultimately an abstraction” (2010: 134 [160, translation 
modified]). Importantly, this also applies to empathy. When we consider our directedness towards 
other persons in its totality, we discover that empathy is typically accompanied by emotive elements, 
such that the sense others have for us involves, from the outset, not only empathic apprehension 
but also affective valuation. While empathically grasping another person’s emotional state, we 
generally feel an immediate response of our own that contributes to the sense the state has for us, in 
that, for example, the other’s anger strikes us frightening, her pride as irritating. However, it is also 
the case that the constitutive role, played by empathy and that played by the stirrings of affect are in 
principle different, and moreover that our interpersonal emotive responses are responsive to 
empathetic senses, without the inverse applying in the same way.20 
This line of thought becomes clearer when we consider Stein’s descriptions of such emotional 
responses. Stein takes the most minimal affective interpersonal response to be a basic form of 
sympathy (Sympathie) or antipathy (Antipathie) that arises when we feel ourselves being touched by or 
coming into contact with (Berührtwerden) another person. She moreover claims that such affections 
“are not sentiments that I hold towards a person for the sake of this or that deed or feature, but 
                                                          
20 I include the caveat ‘in the same way’ here, since it may be that when we examine the way in which 
empathic enactments in their temporal unfolding are motivated, then a unidirectional foundational 
relationship between empathy and affective response will become unsustainable. After all, and as Stein herself 
points out, our epistemic interest in getting to know a certain matter more closely is itself shaped by our 
affective responses to that matter, as well as being dependent upon a more general stance towards the value 
of a specific type of knowledge (2008: 125f. [108]). One consequence of this is that an active empathic 
interest—what Stein at one point calls the “characteristic stance (Haltung)” of empathy, namely our actively 
“turning towards and submerging ourselves within foreign lived experience” (2008: 36 [23, translation 
modified])—may often be rooted in our affective response to the other, as well as in our own prevailing 
personal values and interests. However, these more genetic-phenomenological considerations do not 
challenge the central theses here, namely that (i) our interpersonal affective responses are essentially 
motivated by and founded upon empathetic senses, and that (ii) at least certain basic forms of empathy do 
not presuppose an affective response. 
rather an attraction or repulsion exerted upon me by a simple quale, his unique character (Eigenart)” 
(2010: 222 [265f., translation modified]; see 137 [163]). Stein is here suggesting that there is a certain 
type of elementary other-directed affect that doesn’t involve an explicit appraisal of the other in light 
of her specific personal features, emotional responses, or actions. Rather, and to make use of a 
Husserlian term of phrase, we find ourselves feeling sympathetic or antipathetic towards another 
embodied person more in light of a certain individual style which is already immediately manifest in 
their expressive and affectively coloured movements, a style which is often extremely difficult to 
articulate conceptually, apart from perhaps through usually inadequate stereotypes.21 While the 
givenness of this style is immediately infused with the element of feeling it arouses in us, it is 
nevertheless the case that this style is something grasped empathically (albeit imperfectly and 
approximately), and that my affective stirring is exactly aroused by this style and by no other. Thus, 
even an indeterminate and vague sympathy (or antipathy) for the other presupposes and articulates 
her empathic givenness as a person. 
Moreover, Stein distinguishes from such minimal interpersonal affect what she calls “emotional 
position-takings” with regard to the foreign person, such as approval, admiration, contempt and 
indignation (which, interestingly, she suggests are in some sense based upon or grounded in 
(aufgebaut) primitive sympathy/antipathy). When it comes to these emotional stances we are dealing 
with the “moral valuation and assessment of the character of another person, her sentiments and 
deeds” (2010: 221f. [265, translation modified]). In such cases, it is clear that, in quite different and 
often rather complex ways, the emotional response can only be motivated if the relevant “persons, 
personal features, and personal modes of comportment” it targets are themselves given (2010: 137 
[163, translation modified]). Furthermore, while primitive and higher-order forms of interpersonal 
affect are already interwoven in our experience at the level of perceptual empathy, they may gain 
further motivational import from the empathic presentification mentioned earlier (in which the 
motivational complexity of the other’s emotional and volitional activity is re-accomplished 
explicated), as well as the often more articulate forms of understanding opened up by 
communicative engagement.22 
I take it that the foregoing analysis lends some support to the claim that empathy grounds and 
motivates a certain class of emotions that are directed to the other as a person. But a crucial issue 
remains whether such forms of emotional directedness are sufficient for a 
genuinely recognitional stance. Here too we can take guidance from the way Honneth’s examples of 
the forms of activity that serve to actively render the other socially visible, such as the sparkling 
smile directed towards a friend, or a gesture serving to welcome the other or express gratitude to 
her. As we saw in the opening section (“Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition”), such 
gestures (i) are characterized by their publicity, by having a determinate sense within the social space 
of the encounter that the recognized subject ought to understand, (ii) serve to express a certain type 
                                                          
21 See Husserl (1989: 282–288, 341–343). 
22 Stein also claims that emotional sharing (Mitfühlen) is grounded in empathy (2008: 25f. [14f.]); see Zahavi 
(2014: 245). 
 
ofevaluative affirmation of the recognized person, and simultaneously (iii) intimate a readiness for a 
certain type of practical engagement on behalf of the recognizing subject. It seems to me that Stein’s 
fine-grained analyses can help support and further clarify Honneth’s suggestion that some forms of 
emotional response might fulfil these criteria. In regard to (i), Stein importantly underlines a certain 
not yet mentioned type of empathic achievement, namely what she calls iterative empathy (iterierte 
Einfühlung). In iterative empathy, I am not simply aware of the other as perceptually, affectively, and 
practically engaged with her material environment, but also as empathically experiencing other 
embodied persons, including myself—a situation which involves a curious type of self-othering, 
since I become aware of myself in a wholly new way, namely as an object of empathic perception for 
the other (2008: 30, 80f., 106f. [18, 63, 88f.]). Now one implication of such iterative empathy is that, 
in emotionally responding to the other, I often grasp that the other may be empathically aware of 
the emotional significance of my response. To this extent my emotional response to another person, 
without being strictly communicative in the sense of necessarily involving an intention to convey 
something to her, may nevertheless be lived as an enactment that is laid open for her gaze. 
Thus in assessing whether the criteria of (ii) evaluative affirmation and (iii) practical implication may 
apply for interpersonal affective responses, we should consider more closely the empathic awareness 
which a subject targeted by an emotional response might have of the subject enacting it. In fact, 
Stein’s formulations of the form of empathy in which we are aware of others’ emotions are strikingly 
relevant here: 
Just as my own person is constituted in my own spiritual acts (geistige Akte), the foreign person is 
constituted in acts experienced empathically. I experience his every action as proceeding from a will and this, in 
turn, from a feeling. Simultaneously with this, I am given a level of the person and a realm of values in 
principle experienceable by him, which in turn simultaneously motivates the expectation of future 
possible volitions and actions. Accordingly, a single action and a single bodily expression, such as a look or 
a laugh can give me a glimpse into the core of the person. (2008: 127 [109, translation modified], 
emphasis mine) 
“I not only grasp an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but friendliness as a habitual feature” (2008: 
104 [86, translation modified], emphasis mine). 
As Stein emphasizes in these passages, in seeing another person enact a certain type of glance, 
grimace or gesticulation, or in hearing her omit a vocal sound of a certain rhythm, we are often 
immediately aware of her movements as not only having a certain affective colouring, but also as 
immediately embodying a certain type of evaluative stance which this person has taken towards 
something—something which could be one’s own behaviour or personal features.23 While the 
various types of embodied affective response manifest in this way encompass a broad spectrum, it is 
surely the case that some of them can be accurately described as satisfying (ii), i.e., as forms of 
recognitive affirmation. Indeed, not only Stein’s friendly glance, but also Honneth’s sparkling smiles 
and welcoming gestures seem to illuminate just this connection. Furthermore, Stein also indicates 
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here that the forms of evaluative comportment manifest in the other’s affectively coloured bodily 
movements ground, in the empathizing subject, certain expectations regarding the possible actions 
which the other will perform. And in those cases in which the other’s emotional stance is given as a 
response to oneself, we are typically led to expect that we are in for a certain kind of treatment from 
the other. This suggests one way in which such interpersonal affective responses may, in certain 
cases, satisfy recognitional criteria (iii).24 Finally, I would like to emphasize a further implication of 
this line of thought, one which could have significant implications for broader debates concerning 
recognition. As many of the passages from Stein cited in this last section emphasize, an act of 
emotional recognition is a publically accessible manifestation, not merely of a certain type of 
elementary stance that could in principle be enacted by anyone, but of the unique personality of the 
individual enacting it. In witnessing the sparkling smile of a friend or the welcoming look of a fellow 
traveller, I do not merely feel myself to be the object of an anonymous evaluation. Rather, I 
simultaneously become aware of the subject of this stance as a person, with a determinate and 
unique affective style and character that reaches beyond the individual act of recognition, even if my 




As we saw earlier (“Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition”), in recent publications 
Honneth has cast doubt on the assumption that recognizing another individual, such that they feel 
themselves to be affirmed as socially visible, is always an achievement that is substantially 
constituted by evaluative judgements and practical commitments. Rather, there are forms of person-
recognition that are primarily rooted in perception and emotion. While Honneth’s treatment of the 
issue has tended to conflate perceptual and affective recognition, I argued (in “Stein’s Analysis of 
Empathy”) that Stein’s account of empathy allows us demarcate a form of perceptually-based 
recognition that is distinct from and makes possible emotional recognition. Identifying empathy with 
a basic and ubiquitous form of recognition that does not yet involve any type of evaluative or moral 
stance, it then becomes intelligible how a form of recognition which does involve such a stance can 
function—or fail to function—immediately in our experience of others. I argued that Stein’s account 
of other-directed emotions, which she understands as evaluative responses to other persons that 
find a rationally appropriate basis in empathy, illuminates the sense in our basic recognition of 
others can be immediately interwoven with (without necessarily involving) emotional recognition, 
i.e. with an expressive and affectively rooted appraisal of the other in her personhood. To put my 
claim slightly differently, we can actually be social visible to others in (at least) a twofold manner. On 
the one hand, when being basically or empathetically recognized, we may become aware of ourselves 
as visible to others as persons who are perceptually, affectively, and practically immersed in the 
                                                          
24 For a detailed phenomenological treatment of respect as a moral emotion of the recognitive strand, and as 
grounded in empathy, see Drummond (2006). 
world, and thus as subjects whose personal lives are perceptually accessible and directly intelligible to 
others, albeit in a complex and often ambiguous way. On the other hand, when being emotionally 
recognized, we can also become aware of ourselves as being the object of a certain kind of appraisal 
by another person, one which allows us to expect, on the basis of past experience and familiarity 
with emotive and practical norms, a certain kind of treatment in our dealings with her. 
Finally, I have emphasized that, in being rendered socially visible in this second sense, we also come 
into contact with the other as a subject of unique personal character. While this point might appear 
inconsequential, it underlines that in the emotional personality of the recognizing subject we find a 
crucial enabling condition for emotional recognition, as well as for its possible denial. Furthermore, 
the aspect of personality brought to light in emotional recognition belongs to its social or 
interpersonal dimensions, since it is a person’s enduring style in her emotional responsiveness to 
other persons. While I cannot explore these points further here, it seems to me that a penetrating 
analysis of the conditions under which emotional recognition can become, in its different forms, a 
basic feature of our social lives—and equally, of the origin of the habitually rooted and socially 
reproduced forms of recognitive failure characteristic of what Honneth (1996) calls ‘social 
pathologies’—would benefit from giving a closer consideration to the structural role played therein 
by emotional personality in its social dimensions, as well as to the social conditions under which 
such personality is shaped. Furthermore, it seems to me that such considerations might shed further 
light on our lived sense of being ‘obliged’ to emotionally recognize others, which on occasion causes 
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